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I. INTRODUCTION
[1]
During the course of the twentieth century, American and
international businesses reacted to the increasing costs and uncertainties of
the American civil legal system by trying to create certainty through
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contractual provisions wherever possible. 1 In particular, businesses
developed contractual provisions that set forth procedural boundaries to
potential disputes for the purpose of providing greater certainty as to
where the dispute would be heard, who would hear it, and what laws
would apply. For example, choice of venue 2 and choice of law 3
provisions became commonplace. In addition, clauses dictating the use of
alternative dispute resolution procedures were also widely adopted. 4
Substantively, other clauses not only limited liabilities, warranties, and
damages, 5 but also attempted to establish the applicable burden of proof

1

See generally Michael Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatization of
Procedure, 25 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 51, 52 (1992) (“The rise of forum-selection clauses is
a manifestation of the increasing deference to party autonomy in jurisdictional and related
matters. Not coincidentally, the last two decades have also seen the enforcement of
contractual choice-of-law clauses, and the upholding of waivers of personal jurisdiction
and service-of-process requirements.”). Arguably, the power of contracts to modify legal
procedure began with the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Lochner v. New York,
enshrining “the liberty of contract” as a Constitutionally-protected right. See 198 U.S.
45, 56 (1905). But see Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 486-88
(1955) (upholding state laws regulating contractual relationships where such laws bear a
rational relationship to the “health and welfare of the people.”). Arguably, this same
process works in reverse whenever a court invokes its power to reject a contract “against
the public interest” and justifies its decision as serving to protect such an interest (usually
a significant and concrete one). See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161
A.2d 69, 87, 95 (N.J. 1960) (voiding express waiver of implied warranty of
merchantability where incentivizing the sale of damaged vehicles could result in serious
injuries).
2

See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 518 (1974) (“[A] ‘forum clause should
control absent a strong showing that it should be set aside.’” (quoting Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972))).

3

See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
476 (1989) (affirming decision “[i]nterpreting a choice-of-law clause to make applicable
state rules governing the conduct of arbitration.”).
4

See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23-24, 35 (1991) (enforcing
mandatory arbitration clause of an employment contract for a “Manager of Financial
Service” and dismissing statutory claim alleging age discrimination).
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for any given dispute. 6 While such provisions have been challenged as
unenforceable in circumstances of unequal bargaining powerfor
example contracts between a business and a consumer 7or inequitable
conduct such as fraud, 8 by and large courts have enforced these
provisions, especially in commercial contracts between business
enterprises. 9
[2]
At the turn of the twenty-first century, few businesses realized the
impending challenges that electronic discovery issues would soon bring to
civil litigation in the United States. 10 While businesses had been
5

See e.g., McCarn v. Pac. Bell Directory, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 109, 113 (1992) (upholding
clause limiting damages to cost of contract services, in light of offer to negotiate).
6
See Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They Will Come: Contracts To Remake the
Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 579, 646 (2007)
(stating that burdens of proof can most likely be modified ex ante by contract, both in
criminal and civil cases).
7

See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(“[W]hen a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real choice, signs a
commercially unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly
likely that his consent . . . was ever given to all the terms. In such a case . . . the court
should consider whether the terms of the contract are so unfair that enforcement should
be withheld.”); cf. Ray Tucker & Sons, Inc. v. GTE Directories Sales Corp., 571 N.W.2d
64, 70 (D. Neb. 1997) (“[T]he parties’ respective bargaining positions . . . is an essential
fact upon which any determination of unconscionability depends.”).

8

See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33 (“‛Of course, courts should remain attuned to well-supported
claims that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming
economic power that would provide grounds for the revocation of any contract.’”
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985))).
9

See Williams, 350 F.2d at 450 (noting that only in the rarest of circumstances would a
contract between two businesses reach the legal standard for unconscionability; an
“extreme” departure from “the mores and business practices of the time and place” would
have a chance at being found unconscionable).
10

See BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., MANAGING DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONIC
INFORMATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 1 (Federal Judicial Center 2007), available
at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/eldscpkt.pdf/$file/eldscpkt.pdf.
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complaining about the costs and delays incurred through allegedly
“abusive” discovery tactics for dozens of years, 11 the first decade of the
new century witnessed parallel growth of information in each organization
as well as increased complexity and costs for organizations to defensibly
preserve, collect, and produce relevant information for litigation matters in
the United States. 12 Moreover, as technology continued to change rapidly,
the legal system began to evolve to meet new challenges that contrasted
with those of the old paper world that greatly influenced the initial Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 13 Not surprisingly, many commentators noted
that the current state of jurisprudence on issues related to discovery in the
electronic age is nascent, 14 which in turn causes great uncertainty for
11

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s note (1980) (“There has been
widespread criticism of abuse of discovery. The Committee has considered a number of
proposals to eliminate abuse . . . .”); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s
note (2000) (“The amendment is designed to involve the court more actively in regulating
. . . discovery. The Committee has been informed repeatedly by lawyers that
involvement of the court in managing discovery is an important method of controlling
problems of inappropriately broad discovery. . . . The Committee intends that the parties
and the court focus on the actual claims and defenses involved in the action.”); FED. R.
CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (1983) (acknowledging that some attorneys “use
discovery tools as tactical weapons rather than to expose the facts and illuminate the
issues by overuse of discovery or unnecessary use of defensive weapons or evasive
responses,” which “results in excessively costly and time-consuming activities”).
12

See John H. Beisner, Discovering A Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation
Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 564-70 (2010).

13

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) advisory committee’s note (2006) (amending the rules to
“recogniz[e] that a party must disclose electronically stored information as well as
documents.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note (2006) (stating that the
purpose of the amendment was “designed to address issues raised by difficulties in
locating, retrieving, and providing discovery of some [ESI]. . . . [when] burdens and costs
may make the information on such sources not reasonably accessible”).
14

See Geoff Howard & Seth Weisburst, Trends in Electronic Discovery After the
December 1, 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in ELECTRONIC
DISCOVERY AND RETENTION GUIDANCE FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL 2007 at 13, 33 (PLI
Litigation and Administrative Practice Source Handbook Series No. 766, 2007) (finding
little impact, positive or otherwise, one year after the 2006 addition of “ESI” to the civil
rules, stating that “[i]t will take more time, and more cases, to definitively determine how

4
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companies as to how their preservation, collection, and production steps
will be judged in hindsight.
[3]
With this background, consideration should be given to whether
contractual provisions can provide greater certainty and direction to
parties than the current and future state of law pertaining to electronic
discovery issues. Specifically, much of the uncertainty, excess costs, and
burdens related to electronic discovery in the world of commercial
litigation can be obviated through the mutual adoption and ratification of
terms conscribing the scope of discovery in the event of a dispute that
would be the subject of arbitration or litigation. 15 In essence, such clauses
would provide a pre-defined set of fair rules that the parties agree to
follow in a dispute relating to any preservation or discovery of
electronically stored information.
[4]
To explore the viability of such provisions, this article first
identifies the type of model clauses that could be included in commercial
contracts. For each type of clause, the potential benefits and risks
courts will define and apply each of the new electronic discovery amendments”). The
doctrine is indeed continuing to evolve. New rules are being contemplated yet none are
expected to be published in the immediate future (as of May 29, 2012). See Federal
Rules Published for Comment, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/PublishedRules.aspx
(last visited May. 29, 2012); Civil Rules Suggestions, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/Federal
Rulemaking/ResearchingRules/CivilRulesSuggestions.aspx (last visited May, 29, 2012).
15

Contractual modification of the litigation process was identified as “a rich avenue for
future research” by Robert Scott and George Triantis in their article Anticipating
Litigation in Contract Design. 115 YALE L.J. 814, 857 (2006). Surprisingly, the authors
note that while “arbitration and venue clauses are common in contracts and widely
discussed in the literature, the fact that parties can vary the rules of litigation in their ex
ante contract is relatively unexplored” and they were “hard pressed . . . to find scholarly
treatises on procedure or evidence that identify the subset of these rules that are default
rather than mandatory provisions.” Id. However, discovery is only briefly mentioned by
the same authors who lament the lack of sources in the area at large; “the parties
themselves may further reduce litigation costs by consent. . . . [t]hey can do so narrowly,
by stipulating facts or agreeing to limited discovery.” Id. at 831.

5
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presented by these provisions as they relate to discovery in civil litigation
are identified. Next, the general applicability of public policy doctrines
and whether such discovery-limiting provisions would be viewed by
courts with favor or disfavor are explored. Thereafter, this article analyzes
the potential legal arguments that could be raised to challenge the
enforceability of such provisions.
[5]
In sum, there is considerable merit for considering contractual
provisions that set forth common ground for handling the preservation,
collection, and production of information by parties to commercial
contracts that may later become involved in related disputes. Equally
important, it is likely that such provisions will be uniformly upheld and
enforced absent unique circumstances.
II. LIMITING PROSPECTIVE LITIGATION PRESERVATION AND
DISCOVERY DUTIES BY CONTRACT: ASSESSING THE BUSINESS UTILITY
AND RISK
[6]
Contractual limitations on future discovery obligations and
liabilities can take one or more of five forms: (1) absence of a preservation
duty unless a notice or a request to preserve is served; (2) limitations on
the amount of discovery allowed, including the amount of preservation
required; (3) mechanics governing preservation and production decisions
in a predictable framework; (4) procedures allocating the costs for
ordinary and extraordinary discovery sought; and (5) agreed restrictions
on sanctions for purported discovery failure. After identifying the general
benefits of a contractual approach to prospective preservation and
discovery obligations, each category of proposed clauses is discussed
below, including an identification of potential benefits and drawbacks
from a business and litigation standpoint. Each business should assess its
own risk profile and the value that could be obtained by such clauses
before including them in any contract negotiations.
A. Overview of Benefits to Contract Clauses Governing
Prospective Preservation and Discovery Obligations
6
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[7]
Discovery-limiting clauses are designed to provide benefits in
three ways: reducing the costs of preservation; reducing the costs of
production; and reducing the risk of incurring sanctions. 16 These benefits
arise primarily by establishing limits on the scope of preservation and the
volume of production, thereby eliminating the costs of over-preservation
and over-production. 17 Additionally, parties are aware of their specific
obligations under the terms of the agreement, which should greatly
decrease the chances of being sanctioned for discovery failures, while
simultaneously reducing the costs associated with motions for production
and sanctions.
[8]
While spoliation sanctions can have substantial monetary costs
associated with them, including indirect costs, 18 the costs of preservation
and production are most often cited as the biggest components of
discovery expenses. 19 Perhaps this is because sanctions are quite rare
when compared to the omnipresence of significant preservation burdens. 20
While it is clear that more research is needed in this area, basic estimates
and anecdotal evidence suggest that the costs are significant. For
example, in In re Aspartame Antitrust, the three prevailing defendants
were awarded a combined $510,000 in electronic discovery costs,
16

See FED. R. CIV. P. 29 advisory committee’s note (1993); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.423 (2004); The Sedona Conference®, The Case for
Cooperation, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 339, 343 (2009).
17

See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.423; Thomas Y. Allman,
Managing Preservation Obligations After the 2006 Federal E-Discovery Amendments, 13
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, ¶¶ 16-18 (2007).

18

See Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 607 (S.D. Tex.
2010) (“Spoliation allegations and sanctions motions distract from the merits of a case,
add costs to discovery, and delay resolution.”).
19

See Beisner, supra note 12, at 566, 570.

20

See id. at 569-70. Compare Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir.
2001), with Dan H. Willoughby, Jr. et al., Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the
Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789 (2010).
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amounting to an average of $170,000 per litigant. 21 The Sedona
Conference provides a more scalable estimate in its 2007 Best Practice
Commentary on the Use of Search and Information Retrieval Methods in
E-Discovery, wherein it stated that each gigabyte costs about $30,000 to
review for relevance and privilege. 22 In addition, none of these cost
figures included the costs associated with in-house counsel’s time, the
implementation of preservation policies and tools, or the disruption to
employees’ productivity when dealing with legal holds and collection.
[9]
The predictability and limitations envisioned by the contractual
language provide protections for both requesting and responding parties.
For example, there is recognition that additional measures may be needed
in certain cases but there is a counter-weight of indemnification provisions
to ensure that people only seek extraordinary discovery when truly
necessary. As for routine discovery, the provisions provide clear
guideposts that should avoid disputes and collateral motions practice
altogether. Additionally, the potential for a party to be harmed by limits
on preservation duties and limits on the scope and volume of production
should be minimal.
[10] The costs of drafting and enforcing discovery-limiting provisions
should also be de minimis. First, the contract is already being negotiated
and agreed upon, so there will be few costs associated with that phase of
the agreement process. Second, the language is general enough that it can
be drafted quickly and adapted to the circumstances. Third, once language
is drafted and accepted into one set of contracts, it will likely spread into a
variety of different contracts with only slight modifications required.
Lastly, as companies become more familiar with preservation and
production under this type of agreement, they should be able to optimize
the contract language, as well as their internal policies and practices to
meet the specified obligations, to further reduce costs and burdens.
21

817 F. Supp. 2d 608, 623 (E.D. Pa. 2011).

22

See The Sedona Conference®, The Sedona Conference Best Practices Commentary on
the Use of Search and Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, 8 SEDONA CONF. J.
189, 192 (2007).
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B. Potential Contractual Clauses Related to Prospective
Preservation and Discovery Obligations
1. Notice of Preservation Duty and Request to Preserve
[11] This type of clause could provide that no party to the contract has
any affirmative obligation to preserve evidence absent a specific written
request from another party. The clause could likewise preclude any party
from seeking sanctions due to the failure to preserve evidence absent the
written notice. As with all contractual provisions, the clause could simply
require a written request or prescribe that the request be very detailed in
terms of time frame, subject matter scope, and even target sources of
information for preservation. 23
[12] This type of provision has the obvious benefit of eliminating the
guesswork surrounding the trigger of preservation duties. Indeed, many
organizations have discussed the practical difficulties posed by an ex post
analysis of the “reasonable anticipation” of litigation, 24 and recent
commentary has suggested that the resulting over-preservation imposes a
staggering burden on companies. 25

23

See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (1981) (stating terms of a
contract must be “reasonably certain”).
24

See Rimkus Consulting Grp. Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 613 (S.D. Tex.
2010) (noting the difficulty of making “bright-line distinctions between acceptable and
unacceptable conduct in preserving information . . . either prospectively or with the
benefit (and distortion) of hindsight”).
25

Compare Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 271 F.R.D. 429, 436
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Until a more precise definition is created by rule, a party is welladvised to ‘retain all relevant documents . . . in existence at the time the duty to preserve
attaches.’ In this respect, ‘relevance’ . . . is ‘an extremely broad concept.’” (quoting
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Condit v. Dunne, 225 F.R.D. 100, 105 (S.D.N.Y 2004))), with Letter from Microsoft
Corporation to Hon. David G. Campbell, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules Chair,
U. S. Dist. Court 5 (Aug. 31, 2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
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[13] The downside to this type of provision is two-fold. First, it does
not obviate the potential need to preserve information relevant to noncontractual disputes between the parties and other persons, nor does it
affect any statutory or regulatory obligations to retain information. 26
Thus, it could create a false sense of security if organizations overly rely
on the existence of such clauses. An organization should completely
analyze any potential for non-contractual claims before relying solely on
this type of contractual provision in managing its information and records.
[14] Second, one party may lose the opportunity to demonstrate its
legitimate claims or defenses under the contract if another party destroys
pertinent information prior to receipt of any written notice demanding
preservation. 27 This observation cuts to the heart of the matter. A party
could prospectively give up the right to obtain information relating to
valuable claims or defenses, but it is done knowingly and in service of the
greater good of streamlining and reducing the expense of the dispute
resolution process.
2. Limitations on the Amount of Preservation and
Discovery Required
[15] These types of provisions set forth agreed upon limits on
preservation and discovery efforts that the parties may have to
RulesAndPolicies/rules/DallasMiniConf_Comments/Microsoft.pdf (“[F]or each one-page
trial exhibit, Microsoft produces an average of 1000 pages, manually reviews more than
4500 pages, collects and processes more than 90,000 pages, and preserves almost
340,000 pages. . . . This costs money. But the hard dollars Microsoft spends on data
storage, attorney fees, licensing fees and employee salaries do not reflect the business
disruption and full impact on productivity.”).
26

E.g., Stored Communication Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) (2006); see also California v.
Wilson, 236 Cal. Rptr. 280, 283 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
27

See generally 8 FLORIDA CONSTRUCTION LAW MANUAL, Spoilation of Evidence §
16:21 (2012) (indicating that destruction of evidence does not always warrant harsh
sanctions).

10
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undertake. 28 For example, the parties to the contract may agree that no
party must resort to the preservation of back-up media in connection with
any dispute under the contract. Another example could be agreeing to
forego any forensic analysis of computers to identify and review deleted
data of any type. Yet another example could be agreeing to a preset limit
of the files of no more than five custodians being subject to preservation,
collection, and production in the event of a dispute under the contract. In
some ways, these types of clauses are akin to adoption language that has
surfaced in model orders 29 and default standards issued by courts around
the country.
[16] One significant benefit of these provisions is a limitation on the
amount of effort undertaken in any given dispute under the contract.
Another significant benefit is certainty in the efforts required to be
defensible in the event of a dispute.
[17] The downside to such provisions is the expected problem of
needing information from more persons or places than a party is entitled
under the contract clauses. Another equally significant problem occurs
when a party chooses five individuals (under the example) in good faith as
the targeted custodians only to learn a few months later that a sixth
individual is really the key player in the dispute.
3. Mechanics to Govern Preservation and Production
Decisions and Disputes in a Predictable Framework

28

See D. Md. Loc. Adm. R. app. A [hereinafter Md. Guidelines], available at
http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/publications/forms/DiscoveryGuidelines.pdf (outlining the
Discovery Guidelines for the United States District Court for the District of Maryland).
E.g., E.D. Tex. Civ. R. app. P, available at http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgibin/view_document.cgi?document=22217 (providing the
“[MODEL]
ORDER
REGARDING E-DISCOVERY IN PATENT CASES”); see also Md. Guidelines, supra
note 30 (“The parties . . . are encouraged to submit to the Court for approval their
agreements to expand or limit discovery.”).

29
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[18] These types of provisions could be the equivalent of mandatory
ADR provisions whereby the parties agree in advance as to how particular
issues (i.e., number of discovery requests and completeness of responses)
will be addressed and decided among the parties or by a neutral arbiter in a
cost effective fashion. 30 One possibility is an agreement as to the type of
search methodologies that may be required or acceptable to the parties,
such as keyword or computer-assisted review. Another possibility could
be provisions dealing with the manner by which preservation and
discovery from persons and sources outside of the United States would be
handled to best ensure compliance with any foreign personal data
protection laws. Conceivably, the parties could agree in advance on a
particular neutral party or organization with whom to consult in regard to
discovery disputes. Again, these are but a few examples of the types of
clauses that could be devised.
[19] The benefits of these types of clauses include removing the risk
that an already over-burdened court will have to address preservation and
discovery disputes in an ad hoc fashion. 31 The parties will also benefit
from having a better sense of the types of disputes that could be raised as
well as the likely range of outcomes, thereby decreasing the uncertainty
surrounding discovery practice.
[20] The drawbacks might include the inadvertent creation of a system
of satellite dispute resolution for discovery issues that, if not managed
well, could balloon to defeat the stated objective of reducing disputes and
lowering costs. Another potential downside could be agreeing in advance
to limitations that, when the dispute arises, significantly impair the ability

30

Observers have frequently cited predictability as a leading benefit of contractuallydetermine legal procedures. See, e.g., Linda Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum,
Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57
FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 294 (1988) (“The doctrine of consensual adjudicatory procedure .
. . is lauded for enhancing the values of predictability, certainty, security, stability and
simplicity.”).
31

See id. at 294-95.

12
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to obtain and use information that would be helpful to support claims or
defenses.
4. Procedures to Allocate the Costs for Ordinary and/or
Extraordinary Discovery
[21] This type of clause would provide specific guidance to the
contracting parties as to who pays for the preservation and discovery costs
in the event of a dispute. The clause could be as simple as prohibiting any
type of fee shifting or sharing or it could require that the requesting party
pay for all discovery sought, as well as any requested specific preservation
steps. Alternatively, it could establish a specific formula by which certain
costs are shared or shifted.
[22] The advantages of such provisions again come from the certainty
as to process and the mutual incentives to control costs. Indeed, including
such provisions would likely result in more cost-sharing or cost-shifting
opportunities because most courts shy away from cost allocation in
ordinary litigation, usually citing the American rule on litigation costs.32
Disadvantages include the fact that a predetermined cost allocation
formula may make pursuit of a claim or defense far more expensive than it
would be absent the contract language. Another potential disadvantage is
the complexity that might be required if the parties want to create a series
of presumptions that need to be assessed and applied in any given dispute.
5. Agreed Restrictions on Sanctions for Purported
Discovery Failures
[23] A preemptive limitation on the sanctions that could be sought by a
party if another party failed to preserve or produce relevant information
32

See, e.g., Last Atlantis Capital, LLC v. AGS Specialist Partners, No. 04 C 0397, 2011
WL 6097769, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 2011) (rejecting request for cost-shifting, the court
noted The Sedona Conference recognized that cost-shifting was “inconsistent with the so
called ‘American Rule’ that each party bears its own litigation costs” and that “[t]he party
seeking cost-shifting . . . bears the burden of overcoming that presumption.”).

13
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could be very beneficial to both parties to a contract. The clear advantage
to such a provision would be eliminating the risks currently attendant to
discovery today where any failure or mistake, no matter how innocent,
instantly can be magnified into negligence, or worse to support an award
of sanctions ranging from monetary penalties to case-altering jury
instructions to outright dismissal of claims or defenses. A downside is the
risk that a bad actor takes advantage of such protections to destroy
relevant information with impunity, thereby impairing the claims or
defenses of relatively innocent parties. 33 Careful drafting of this clause
should allow parties to eliminate the uncertainty surrounding negligent
conduct and limit any sanctions to those situations only involving actual
and knowing malfeasance.
[24] Sample contract language for these five categories of clauses is
described further in Part V and set forth in the Appendix. While there are
infinite variations as to the language that could be employed in any of
these five categories, the potential benefits of clarity, risk reduction, and
cost savings are well worth exploration by entities involved in a
significant number of commercial. It is important for companies to be
well-informed and seek counsel when considering the relative value of
including such contract language.
III. LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR CONTRACTUAL DISCOVERY LIMITATIONS
[25] While no judicial decisions exist directly addressing this issue,
established law supports the enforceability of other contractual
modifications to the litigation processparticularly a small set of nearubiquitous provisions that include venue, jury waiver, choice of law, and

33

See, e.g., Rosenthal Collins Grp., LLC v. Trading Tech. Int’l., Inc., No. 05 C 4088,
2011 WL 722467, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2011) (assessing one million dollars in fines
against plaintiff, requiring plaintiff to pay attorney’s fees and court costs, and entering
default judgment in favor of defendant). Rosenthal provides a particularly accurate
representation of the downside of limiting sanctions, as the court fined the plaintiff twice
for modifying data submitted to the court. Id.
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arbitration clauses. 34 The jurisprudence regarding enforceability of such
contractual provisions is informative with regard to legal support for
contractual clauses that limit prospective preservation and discovery
obligations.
[26] Many courts have upheld choice of venue or forum selection
provisions. 35 Generally, a forum selection clause is enforceable unless it
“contravene[s] a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is
brought, whether declared by statute or judicial decision.” 36 Courts have
refined this mandate to hold that
[a] forum-selection clause is unenforceable if it is
determined that any of the three following circumstances
are applicable: (1) enforcement of the clause would
effectively prevent a party from having his day in court; (2)
the forum-selection clause itself was procured by
overreaching or fraud; or (3) the [c]ourt’s enforcement of
the forum-selection clause would violate a strong public
policy. 37
Our informal survey of cases indicates that most challenges to forum
selection clauses fail because there exist few fact situations that implicate
the policy considerations identified by the Supreme Court in Bremen. 38

34

See generally Liles v. Ginn-La W. End, Ltd., 631 F.3d 1242, 1256-57 (11th Cir. 2011)
(finding a forum-selection clause and an arbitration clause enforceable); Speed v. Omega
Protein, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 2d 668, 672 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (considering a forum-selection
clause in determining proper venue).
35

See Liles, 631 F.3d at 1243; Speed, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 673.

36

M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).

37

See Speed, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 672.

38

See e.g., Liles, 631 F.3d at 1243 (holding the forum-selection clause enforceable).
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[27] Likewise, courts have routinely upheld choice of law provisions
even though they affect the substantive outcomes of disputes. 39 Section
187 of the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws provides in pertinent
part:
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern
their contractual rights and duties will be applied, even if
the particular issue is one which the parties could not have
resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement
directed to that issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the
parties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable
basis for the parties' choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be
contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a
materially greater interest than the chosen state in the
determination of the particular issue and which, under the
rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the
absence of an effective choice of law by the parties. 40
[28] Comment e to Section 187 of the Restatement sets forth the basic
rationale of having such clauses:
Prime objectives of contract law are to protect the justified
expectations of the parties and to make it possible for them
to foretell with accuracy what will be their rights and
liabilities under the contract. These objectives may best be
attained in multistate transactions by letting the parties
choose the law to govern the validity of the contract and the
rights created thereby.
In this way, certainty and

39

E.g., Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Aalco Express Co., 592 F. Supp.
664, 667 (E.D. Mo. 1984); Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 469 A.2d 867, 887 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1984); Morris v. Watsco, Inc., 433 N.E.2d 886, 889 (Mass. 1982); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1971).
40

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
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predictability of result are most likely to be secured.
Giving parties this power of choice is also consistent with
the fact that, in contrast to other areas of the law, persons
are free within broad limits to determine the nature of their
contractual obligations. 41
[29] Courts have routinely upheld choice of law provisions, 42 yet there
are notable circumstances where exceptions apply and courts do not
enforce the provisions. 43 In almost all of the exceptions, courts have
found a fundamental issue of state law that was outcome determinative
(e.g., whether claims would be barred by a different statute of limitations
or whether one state recognized a cause of action not recognized by
another). 44
[30] With respect to mandatory arbitration provisions, such clauses
have been enforced in situations where there is some inequality in
bargaining power (between companies and their employees), 45 where the
arbitration agreement is part of a standardized non-negotiable form, 46 and
41

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. e (1971).

42

See, e.g., N. Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Point Judith Marina, LLC, 579 F.3d 61, 72 (1st Cir.
2010) (enforcing choice of law provision); see also PAE Gov’t Servs, Inc. v. MPRI, Inc.,
514 F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 2007).

43

See, e.g., Homa v. Am. Express Co., 558 F.3d 225, 227, 230-31 (3d Cir. 2009)
(predicting that, if the claims at issue were of such a low value as effectively to preclude
relief when decided individually, then the New Jersey Supreme Court would hold that the
agreements’ choice of Utah law, which expressly allowed class-arbitration waivers, was
unenforceable under New Jersey choice-of-law rules, because it would violate a
fundamental public policy of New Jersey).
44

See e.g., Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941) (holding
that federal courts may not, by enforcing an independent “general law” of conflict of
laws, controvert local policies pursued by a state within limits permitted by the
Constitution).
45

See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991).
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where the claims to be arbitrated are torts. 47 Nevertheless, there are still
limits to courts’ enforcement of arbitration clauses. For example, in Cole
v. Burns International Security Services, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
refused to enforce an arbitration clause that required employees to pay for
the services of an arbitrator beyond any reasonable costs, such as filing or
administrative expenses. 48 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has
observed that the costs of arbitration should not prohibit the adjudication
of wrongs. 49 However, the Court nevertheless held that when “a party
seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration
would be prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden of showing
the likelihood of incurring such costs.” 50 It is also important to note that
the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) 51 has been frequently cited as a
significant factor in support of enforcing arbitration clauses, 52 and the
Supreme Court has recognized a clear federal policy in favor of
arbitration. 53 In short, mandatory arbitration clauses are upheld in the
majority of cases, including those involving unequal bargaining power.
[31] Based on decisions analyzing the enforceability of forum selection,
choice of law, and arbitration clauses, it is very likely that the contractual
discovery limitations described herein will be enforceable between
46

See, e.g., Battle v. Prudential Ins. Co., 973 F. Supp. 861, 867 (D. Minn. 1997).

47

See, e.g., Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc’y v. JRY, 320 F. App’x 216, 222 (5th
Cir. 2009).

48

105 F.3d 1465, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

49

See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91-92 (2000).

50

Id. at 92.

51

United States Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006).

52

See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22
(1983).

53

See Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 91; see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S.
___, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011).
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commercial parties of sufficient sophistication, especially with drafting
tailored to the facts of the contractual relationship. There is ample legal
authority that illustrates that public policy in fact supports cooperative
efforts to limit discovery consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure54
and its state court analogues. 55 Moreover, ample support exists to support
the proposition that since the mid 1970’s, public policy has favored
meaningful limits on civil discovery. 56 For example, in 1976 an American
Bar Association (“ABA”) task force was established to address the unfair
use of the discovery process. 57 In the process of studying the question, an
ABA committee concluded that discovery abuses broke down into three
common complaints: first, discovery was too costly; second, discovery
procedures were being misused; and third, discovery was subject to
“overuse.” 58
54

See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (stating that rules should be administered to “secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding”).
55

See William A. Gross Constr. Assocs. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 256 F.R.D. 134, 136
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[T]he best solution in the entire area of electronic discovery is
cooperation among counsel. This Court strongly endorses The Sedona Conference
Proclamation.”); see also The Sedona Conference, The Case for Cooperation, 10
SEDONA CONF. J. 339, 342 (2009); AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & THE INST. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE
INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM at 2 (2009),
available at http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?
Section=Home&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=4008.
56

See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) advisory committee’s note (1970) (explaining that, in
the 1970 amendment to subdivision (c), “drafting changes [were] made to carry out and
clarify the sense of the rule” and “[i]nsertions [were] made to avoid any possible
implication that a protective order does not extend to ‘time’ as well as to ‘place’ or may
not safeguard against ‘undue burden or expense’”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 33(c)
advisory committee’s note (1970) (noting that the purpose of the 1970 amendment adding
subdivision (c) to FRCP 33 was to give “the party an option to make the records available
and place the burden of research on the party who seeks the information”).
57

See AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF POUND CONFERENCE FOLLOW-UP TASK FORCE
(1976), reprinted in 74 F.R.D. 159, 191 (1976).
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[32] The 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
were enacted in response to the many and frequent calls for discovery
reform. 59 States thereafter implemented their own reforms, with many
adopting the same or similar provisions to ensure a proportional approach
to discovery in civil matters. 60 In enacting the 1983 rules, the Advisory
Committee noted that “[e]xcessive discovery and evasion or resistance to
reasonable discovery requests pose significant problems.” 61 Accordingly,
Rule 26(b)(1) was amended to grant courts the authority to limit discovery
where it was found to be redundant or duplicative. 62 The Committee
Notes to the 1983 Amendments indicate that Rule 26(b)(1)(iii) was
designed to address the problem of disproportionate discovery, and lists
factors to be considered when determining proportionality: the “nature and
complexity” of the lawsuit, “the importance of the issues at stake,” the
parties’ resources, and “the significance of the substantive issues.” 63 The
Committee Notes also explicitly state that public policy concerns might
have importance beyond the monetary amount at stake and the
proportionality calculus should include this more esoteric consideration. 64
58

American Bar Association, Comments on Revised Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1979) (on file with author).
59

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (1983).

60

See Patricia A. Ebener, INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COURT EFFORTS TO REDUCE
PRETRIAL DELAY: A NATIONAL INVENTORY, at xi-xii (1981) (noting that, by 1980,
twenty-nine states had implemented reforms to expedite pretrial discovery, which ranged
from limiting the number of interrogatories that a party could request, to “[a]ssigning
penalties to attorneys who bring frivolous [discovery] motions”).
61

FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (1983).

62

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note (1983) (explaining that the
objective of the 1983 amendment was “to guard against redundant or disproportionate
discovery by giving the court authority to reduce the amount of discovery that may be
directed to matters that are otherwise proper subjects of inquiry”).

63

FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (1983).

64

Id.
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The Advisory Committee further explained that the Rule sought to “reduce
repetitiveness and to oblige lawyers to think through their discovery
activities in advance so that full utilization is made of each deposition,
document request, or set of interrogatories.” 65 To effectuate this mandate,
courts were expected to apply the rules in an even-handed manner, thereby
preventing the use of discovery as a means of coercion or as a tool in a
“war of attrition.” 66
[33] In light of this history and thirty years of jurisprudence in which
courts have routinely entered and enforced the parties’ case management
agreements and otherwise imposed limits on civil discovery, there is
ample ground to conclude that public policy would favor contractual
clauses that prescribe limits on preservation and discovery before disputes
arise. Moreover, unless there is fraud or duress in the contracting process,
there are no clearly identifiable general, federal, or state policies that are
contrary to the use of such clauses.
Thus, examination of the
enforceability of such clauses will turn on particular facts regarding the
circumstances of the contracting, which is addressed in the next section.
IV. POTENTIAL CHALLENGES TO THE ENFORCEABILITY OF
CONTRACTUAL LIMITATIONS ON PROSPECTIVE PRESERVATION AND
DISCOVERY OBLIGATIONS IN CIVIL LITIGATION
[34] The potential benefits of contractual preservation and discovery
limitations can be washed away entirely if the specific proposed
provisions are found unenforceable for any reason. Indeed, for each
measure of uncertainty of the enforceability of a given provision, there is a
corresponding diminishment of the benefits as the parties are forced to
hedge proportionately against the risk of the provision’s failure. Thus, it is
critical to examine the possible challenges to contract provisions of the

65

Id.

66

Id.
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type suggested in this article and the likely outcome of such challenges
before businesses start incorporating such provisions into contracts.
[35] At the outset, it should be understood that like other parts of the
civil litigation process, discovery is not constitutionally mandated and is
therefore subject to waiver and modification according to the same rules
of enforceability that govern most contractual agreements. 67 Therefore,
courts assess the enforceability of such contract provisions in light of
whether they violate public policy, are unconscionable, shield parties from
tort liability, purport to waive any third parties’ rights, or improperly usurp
judicial authority or procedural rules. 68 The sections below walk through
each of these potential challenges and predict possible outcomes.
A. Contracts Against the Public Interest
[36] Courts have long been reluctant to nullify agreements for allegedly
violating public policy, a power the Supreme Court of Nebraska called
67

See Developments in the Law - Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940, 979 n.301 (1991)
(stating “a court may refuse to enforce a discovery modification if it is unconscionable”
just like other contract provisions); cf. Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting
for Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 545 (2011) (“As for limitations on
discovery, a large body of literature emphasizes the importance of full discovery to
judicial decisions in such areas of the law as employment discrimination and consumer
protection, in which claims, legal theories, and evidentiary proofs cannot be developed
without a rich factual base. Similarly, commentators point to the relevance of tort actions
for improving federal agency policymaking by encouraging the disclosure of
information.”).
68

See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627
(1985) (“Of course, courts should remain attuned to well-supported claims that the
agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power
that would provide grounds ‘for the revocation of any contract,’” (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2
(2006))). Because these doctrines have sprung from common law, their precise contours
are defined by the laws of the various states, as well as some influential federal cases like
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). However, although there is no
established federal common law for enforcing these rules, convergence over the course of
contracts’ lengthy American history has resulted in significant interstate consistency.
Thus, the validity of commercial agreements to limit discovery will likely be answered in
a similar way by state and federal courts in different jurisdictions.
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“delicate and undefined.” 69 That being said, an affected party may argue
that limiting the availability of established procedures under state and
federal laws, such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is against the
public interest because it diminishes or eliminates the states’ critical role
of adjudicating disputes through public forums. Indeed, many courts have
stated that broad discovery is a “cornerstone of the litigation process
contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” 70
[37] Public policy objections prevail in those instances where the
contract language at issue impairs an independent fundamental interest of
the state. 71 A reputable summary of the public policy considerations
weighing against clauses was recently set forth by Kevin Davis and Helen
Hershkoff; identifying first, “a large body of literature [that] emphasizes
the importance of full discovery to judicial decisions in such areas of the
law as employment discrimination and consumer protection, in which
claims, legal theories, and evidentiary proofs cannot be developed without
a rich factual base,” and second, “the relevance of tort actions for
improving federal agency policymaking by encouraging the disclosure of
information,” in products liability cases and some class action suits. 72 For

69

See Custer Pub. Power Dist. v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 75 N.W.2d 619, 628-29
(Neb. 1956).
70

See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (quoting Jones v. Goord, No. 95 Civ. 8026, 2002 WL 1007614, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
May 16, 2002)); see also Wood v. Capital One Servs., LLC, No. 5:09–CV–1445, 2011
WL 2154279, *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2011) (quoting Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 311).

71

See, e.g., Mason v. Orthodontic Ctrs. of Colo., Inc., 516 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1216-17 (D.
Colo. 2007) (finding the public interest prohibiting fee splitting outweighed a feesplitting contract provision); Aurora Nat. Life Assurance Co. v. Harrison, 462 F. Supp.
2d 951, 971-72 (S.D. Iowa 2006), aff'd, sub nom. Aurora Nat. Life Assurance Co. v.
Ewing, 527 F.3d 1358 (8th Cir. 2008). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §178 (1981) (terms of agreements are unenforceable if enforcement is
outweighed by public policy).
72

Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 67, at 545.
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example, in Brack v. Omni Loan Company, the California Fourth District
Court of Appeal declined to enforce a choice of law provision that would
have prevented California citizens from prevailing on claims against a
Nevada lender. 73 The court stated that enforcement of the provision
would conflict with a “fundamental policy” of California, “in
circumstances in which California has a greater interest than Nevada” (i.e.,
where California citizens were being harmed). 74 Another example is
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., where the Supreme Court of New
Jersey decided that auto manufacturers’ express waiver of the implied
warranty of merchantability was “inimical” to the public interest where it
would bar tort claims for injuries arising from latent automobile defects. 75
[38] Nevertheless, public policy is not a likely bar to enforcing
agreements that limit the scope of discovery where the goal is to prevent
excessive preservation and production and the limitations only apply in the
context of commercial contracts between business entities. It seems
unlikely that any party could identify a “fundamental” public interest
mandating extensive discovery in civil claims between sophisticated
litigants, and it is uncertain how any other person could intervene to assert
such an interest. Even if the effect of the limitation would limit or
preclude claims, in light of the relatively equal bargaining power and
deference to contractual relations, it is unlikely that a court would
intervene and invalidate a limitation based upon a public policy exception.
Finally, in light of the emergence of state and federal efforts to encourage
more limited and tailored discovery over the past three decades, 76 it does
not appear likely that challenges to discovery limitations based on public
policy grounds will be successful absent some very unique circumstances,
73

80 Cal. Rptr. 3d 275, 287 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).

74

Id.

75

161 A.2d 69, 87 (N.J. 1960) (denying release of liability for grossly negligent handling
of consumer automobiles by dealership, despite express waiver of the implied warranty
of merchantability by contract).
76

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (1993).
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such as the widespread intentional destruction of evidence or some other
unquestionably “bad” act while purportedly acting in compliance with the
contractual provisions.
B. Unconscionability
[39] Unconscionability is a finding that a contract or clause should not
be enforced because the terms are so one-sided that “no reasonable person
would make them and no fair and honest person would accept them.” 77
Certainly influenced by the public interest in not having fellow citizens
taken advantage of, unconscionability analysis is nevertheless slightly
more grounded and formalized. It is composed of two parts: procedural
and substantive unconscionability. 78
Procedural unconscionability
describes a situation where the contractual process is so unfair that one
party has not been given any meaningful choice. 79 While substantive
unconscionability involves one party using a pronounced advantage in
bargaining power to achieve unfair terms. 80 Most jurisdictions have
decided that substantive unconscionability is sufficient to void an
agreement while a few jurisdictions require both the procedural and
substantive components. 81 Practically speaking, courts will often gloss
over these subtle distinctions and concentrate on the essence of
unconscionability: “a gross inequality of bargaining power.” 82
77

See Fanning v. Fritz’s Pontiac-Cadillac-Buick, 472 S.E.2d 242, 245 (S.C. 1996) (citing
Jones Leasing v. Gene Phillips & Assoc., 318 S.E.2d 31 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984)).
78

See 8 Samuel Williston & Richard A. Lord, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
18:10 (4th ed. 2010).
79

Id.

80

Id.

81

See Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 58 (Ariz. 1995) (concluding that
substantive unconscionability is sufficient for a finding of unenforceability).
82

Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965); cf. Ray
Tucker & Sons v. GTE Directories Sales Corp., 571 N.W.2d 64, 70 (Neb. 1997).
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[40] Although the doctrine is described in comparative terms, it would
be more accurate in the commercial setting to say that a contract will be
enforced if both parties meet a minimum level of sophistication. For
example, in Myers v. Nebraska Investment Council, an investment
company argued that its agreement with the State of Nebraska was
unconscionable because the State had far more resources at its disposal. 83
While the underlying claim was true with respect to total assets, the
district court rejected the legal conclusion, noting that “substantive
unconscionability [in a commercial setting, standing] alone is usually
insufficient to void a contract or clause.” 84 The Eighth Circuit endorsed a
similar approach in Faber v. Menard, Inc., finding that an agreement
between a “large national company” and an employee was not
“automatically unconscionable.” 85 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit held that
“it is not enough that the parties have unequal bargaining power, a vast
disparity is required.” 86 In other words, an agreement would have to be
inconsistent with regular business practices to an “extreme” degree to be
Due to that high standard, the paradigm for
unconscionable. 87
unconscionability remains “contracts of adhesion” between large
corporations and consumers. 88
83

See Myers v. Neb. Inv. Council, 724 N.W.2d 776, 798-99 (Neb. 2006).

84

Id. at 799 (citing Adams v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 498 N.W.2d 577 (Neb. 1992)); 1 E.
Allan Farnsworth, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.28 (2d ed. 1990).
85

367 F.3d 1048, 1053 (8th Cir. 2004).

86

Scovill v. WSYX/ABC, Sinclair Broad. Grp., Inc., 425 F.3d 1012, 1017-18 (6th Cir.
2005) (citing Faber v. Menard, Inc., 367 F.3d 1048, 1054 (8th Cir. 2004)).
87

See Williams, 350 F.2d at 450 (citing 1 ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §
128 (1963) (noting that “[t]he terms are to be considered ‘in the light of the general
commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case,’” and
concluding that Corbin is correct that “the test as being whether the terms are ‘so extreme
as to appear unconscionable according to the mores and business practices of the time
and place’”).
88

Compare D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 186 (1972) (finding that an
agreement between two companies did not involve a “refusal to deal,” a contract of
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[41] It is unlikely that discovery limitation clauses in commercial
contracts between businesses, as contemplated by this article, would run
afoul of the unconscionability standards. Not only would the entities be
presumably sophisticated, even if not equally so, the contract limitations
would be applicable to all of the parties to the agreement. While it is true
that one of the parties may benefit more than the other from having limited
discovery when a particular dispute arises in the future, it is difficult to
predict which party that will be. Stated otherwise, unconscionability must
be present at the time the contract is made. 89 If one party claims a need
for extensive discovery after a dispute arises, but cannot get it due to this
type of agreement, the unconscionability doctrine is not implicated. 90
C. Tort Claims by Contracting and Third Parties
[42] Courts have routinely viewed contractual limitations with greater
scrutiny when they impact tort claims, especially intentional torts. 91 For
example, in Rodenbur v. Kaufmann, the D.C. Circuit strictly interpreted a
adhesion, or unequal bargaining power), with Brennan v. Bally Total Fitness, 198 F.
Supp. 2d 377, 382-83 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (voiding agreement signed by employee who
“reasonably felt that she had no choice but to sign . . . or she would lose her job,” while
noting that “inequality in bargaining power between employers and employees is not
alone sufficient” to find unconscionability).
89

See U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2011) (contract must be “unconscionable at the time it was
made” to be unenforceable); see also AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1740
(2011) (both the majority and dissenting opinions discuss hypothetical extension of
unconscionability arguments under California law to restrictions on “full” and “judicially
monitored” discovery in the context of arbitration agreements, seemingly indicating that
such restrictions, at least in the setting of arbitration agreements, would not be subject to
unconscionability attacks per se under, respectively, the holding of the majority opinion
or the minority opinion’s view of existing jurisprudence). But cf. Lau v. Mercedes-Benz
USA, LLC, No. CV 11-1940, 2012 WL 370557, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2012) (holding
that Conception case did not preclude independent analysis and application of state law
unconscionability doctrines to enforceability of arbitration agreements).

90

91

Id.
E.g., Rodenbur v. Kaufmann, 320 F.2d 679, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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jury waiver clause for all claims “arising” from a home lease, finding that
in spite of the broad language, it was not intended to apply to tort claims.92
Generally, while waivers of claims for negligent acts bind parties in most
states, those provisions must be “clear, definite and unambiguous” and
will not extend to recklessness, gross negligence, or intentional torts. 93
Therefore, courts might view contractual limitations on discovery
differently if there are claims of fraud or statutory violations, such as
antitrust claims, especially if there is a perception that a party is
attempting to use discovery limitations to escape liability for intentional
malfeasance.
[43] A related consideration is remembering that while parties can
contractually modify their legal obligations with regard to preservation
between themselves such clauses will not prevent another person from
asserting that an event triggered an independent preservation duty as to
which the third person was the beneficiary. While this argument seems
axiomatic, 94 there is a danger that contracting parties would overestimate
the effect of contract clauses by disregarding the existence of other, noncontracting parties that may be able to argue that a preservation duty was
owed to them as a potential litigant.
[44] Accordingly, parties considering the use of contractual discovery
limitations should understand that a court may be more willing to consider
92

See id. at 684.

93

Standard Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 186 F.2d 44, 47 (10th Cir. 1951);
see RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 574 (1932).
94

Compare Hittson v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. 86 P.2d 1037, 1039 (N.M. 1939)
(stating that a person can waive any contractual, statutory, or constitutional right
“provided it is intended for his sole benefit, and does not infringe upon the rights of
others, and such waiver is not against public policy”), with Point Blank Solutions, Inc. v.
Toyobo Am., Inc., No. 09-6116-CIV, 2011 WL 1456029, at *26 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 2011)
(finding that reasonable anticipation of investigation by government and suit by Second
Chance Inc., did not trigger duty to preserve documents for other, then-unknown future
plaintiffs).
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a challenge to a commercial discovery agreement in a case involving
extra-contractual claims of fraud, intellectual property theft, unfair
business practices, or cases that impact non-parties to the contract.
Likewise, parties should understand that contractual limitations between
the parties will not affect any preservation duties that arise separately
where other persons could claim that information should have been
preserved with respect to any matter involving such persons.
D. Usurpation of Judicial Authority and Conflicts with
Procedural Rules
[45] Similar to judges’ occasional refusal to enforce contractual
provisions based on overriding public interests, they may also reject
provisions that seek to limit discovery by restraining judicial discretion or
inherent powers. Judges have the inherent authority to hold persons in
contempt of court, 95 to impose sanctions, to directly question witnesses, 96
to call witnesses whom the parties do not wish to call, 97 and to demand the
production of evidence. 98 Notably, court opinions and the Restatement of
Conflict of Laws have stated that forum courts will always apply their
jurisdiction’s own procedural rules while deferring to the parties’ choice
of substantive rules. 99 This authority raises an important issue for parties
seeking to limit discovery because the discovery rules are part of the state
95

See Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 435, 450 (1911) (holding that
court’s power to hold people in contempt is a “necessary and integral part of the
independence of the judiciary, and is absolutely essential to the performance of the[ir]
duties”).
96

FED. R. EVID. 614(b); see Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 333, 336 (7th Cir. 1998).

97

See United States v. Ostrer, 422 F. Supp. 95, 103 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (stating that the
court’s power to call witnesses is rarely invoked).

98

See McKinley v. S. Pac. Co., 181 P.2d 899, 908 (1947).

99

See Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Aalco Express Co., 592 F. Supp.
664, 666 (E.D. Mo. 1984); Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 469 A.2d 867, 887 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1984); Morris v. Watsco, Inc., 433 N.E.2d 886, 889 (Mass. 1982); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1971).
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and federal rules of civil procedure. 100 In light of the fact that certain laws
are found to be procedural, including general statutes of limitations,
discovery-limiting agreements may be at risk for rejection as part of the
same group. 101
[46] On the other hand, it is important to note that these discovery
agreements are not intended to force courts to apply the discovery rules of
other jurisdictions, which is precisely the reason cited for rejecting parties’
choice of procedural rulesit is inefficient and unfair to ask courts to
apply rules that they are unfamiliar with, especially when those rules will
not regularly have a substantive effect on the outcome of a case. 102
Rather, the goal of the contractual discovery limitations is twofold. First,
they function to establish agreed upon specifics to better define common
law duties, state rules, and federal rules so that parties can conduct their
preservation and production with predictable consequences instead of
arguing over interpretation later. Second, the limitations narrow the scope
of those same discovery rules, but do so within the procedural framework
that those rules have established without exceeding their bounds or
introducing procedures from other jurisdictions. These limitations, while
they undoubtedly affect procedure, do not replace local rules. They
merely attempt to achieve the same clarity and reasonable limits that are
the goals of the model orders, scheduling orders, and other court initiatives
discussed above.
[47] However, not all courts have foreclosed upon the possibility of
enforcing procedural choices. One federal court stated: “[t]his Court does
not decide whether the parties to a collective bargaining agreement or a
100

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26; Klonoski v. Mahlab, 156 F.3d 255, 271 (1st Cir. 1998)
(discussing the rules of evidence and their relationship to the federal discovery rules).
101

See Aalco Express Co., Inc., 592 F. Supp. at 667.

102

See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469 (1965) (relying on the same substantive
versus procedural distinctions in the Erie doctrine context to hold that the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure apply whenever “the difference between the two [state and federal]
rules would be of scant, if any, relevance to the choice of a forum”).
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pension trust agreement can . . . provide expressly for a particular [a
procedural rule].” 103 This possibility is echoed by the Restatement of
Conflict of Laws, which states, “[o]ne factor is whether the issue is one to
which the parties are likely to have given thought in the course of entering
into the transaction.” 104 Therefore, the parties should include language
stating that it is their understanding that these provisions will be
enforceable even if they are treated as procedural rules. In fact, this type
of broad provision has been used successfully in the past. 105
[48] Additionally, parties can minimize the chance that uncertainty on
this point will be exploited as a way to frustrate the agreement by deciding
to indemnify each other for the expenses associated with any effort to
dispute the agreement’s enforceability. When used in conjunction with
the stipulations discussed in the preceding paragraph, any remaining
incentive to dispute the agreement’s enforceability is eliminated. While
the contractual understanding that the rules will be enforced even if they
are determined to be procedural makes the chances of prevailing on this
issue low, the indemnification provisions should remove any incentive to
dispute this fact.
[49] It is worth mentioning that courts often look at state public policy
to decide choice of law issues alongside the distinction between
substantive and procedural rules. 106 We have already stated our position
103

Aalco Express Co., 592 F. Supp. at 667.

104

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 cmt. a (1971).

105

See Mayo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1104-05 (N.D. Cal.
2003) (giving effect to an agreement that “[t]he law of the State of New York will apply
in all respects, including but not limited to determination of applicable statutes of
limitation and available remedies,” as incorporating procedural elements such as statutes
of limitation).
106

See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941) (reasoning
that “[i]t is not for the federal courts to thwart . . . local policies” and finding that states
are “free to determine whether a given matter is to be governed by the law of the forum
or some other law”).
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that public policy concerns will not result in discovery limitations being
voided. However, parties can strengthen this position by additionally
indemnifying one another against the costs of disputing this aspect of
enforceability.
V. SAMPLE CONTRACTUAL TERMS
[50] We have included in the Appendix a sample contractual provision
setting forth our vision of complete eDiscovery limiting provisions. It is
our hope that practitioners will be able to use this contractual language as
a starting point in negotiating these clauses into their agreements where
appropriate.
[51] Broadly, the terms are intended to limit discovery rather than to
dictate the manner of discovery. This is in keeping with the goal of letting
each court employ its own procedural rules, but prospectively agreeing to
define the actions that will be available to parties under those rules. This
approach also avoids any issues that could be raised by contractually
requiring a party to undertake an action that may be proscribed by privacy
law or a blocking statute. Apart from the less controversial undertakings
regarding cooperation, these provisions generally focus on what parties are
agreeing not to do, rather than what they will do. There are several
operative principles embodied in the language in the Appendix:
1. Preservation only required upon notice
Parties will not be held liable for failures to preserve unless and
until a notice of claim has been received from the other party.
2. Adequate preservation steps defined
A party complying with the requirements set forth in the
sample language will be deemed to have met their preservation
obligations. Extraordinary steps, such as preservation of
backup tapes or volatile memory, are expressly excluded from
a party’s obligations.
3. Limit collection and search
The model language includes strict numeric limits on
custodians and server based systems. If a party includes data
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from a non-enumerated custodian in order to support its own
claims or defenses, that custodian is then deemed “in play.”
4. Require actual knowledge for sanctions
No party will be held liable for sanctions absent a showing of
actual knowledge supported by clear and convincing evidence.
[52] These principles, combined with the indemnification and
cooperation provisions, should provide an adequate framework for parties
to thoughtfully and cost-effectively manage the eDiscovery process.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite speculation that new Federal Rules may be on the horizon,
with the states presumably to follow, companies should take matters into
their own hands and limit discovery without governmental or judicial
intervention in order to save costs. While organizations have not yet
tested this concept in the form of contractual agreements that have been
litigated, the emergence of local standing orders and local rules supports
the general proposition that more clearly defined obligations and
procedures help reduce costs and burdens for everyone, including the
judiciary. Indeed, where both parties to a commercial contract recognize
the problem, a cooperative effort to preemptively limit discovery should
produce significant cost savings for both parties with little downside.
None of the traditional indicia of unenforceabilitysuch as harm to public
interests, usurpation of judicial power, or unequal bargaining powerare
present. In such circumstances, it is hard to imagine that courts would be
disposed to do anything except find ways to enforce the parties’
agreements regarding preservation and discovery obligations.
[53]

[54] In going down the path of self-imposed discovery limitations,
companies should nevertheless understand the potential limitations on
contractual provisions that purport to limit discovery and preservation
duties. First, the agreements are unlikely to apply to circumstances
involving non-contractual claims, especially those involving persons that
were not involved in the contract. Second, it is also less likely that a court
will enforce the limitations when tort or statutory claims are alleged, even
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in jurisdictions that permit tort claims to proceed in conjunction with
contract claims. Third, it is less likely that the provision would be upheld
as part of a contract outside the commercial context (i.e., there is a greater
likelihood that courts would refuse to impose such contractual limitations
on individual consumers). Fourth, courts always retain inherent authority
despite what the parties may agree upon, and a court may exercise that
power if it perceives that the limitations are working some fundamental
unfairness to the resolution of the dispute.
APPENDIX: SAMPLE CONTRACT LANGUAGE
I.

II.

Disputes: Discovery. The Parties recognize that the costs of
litigation, arbitration, or any other mode of dispute resolution can
be substantial. Each Party agrees that in the interests of
minimizing dispute resolution costs, speeding resolution time, and
decreasing uncertainty of costs, it may be desirable for both
Parties to waive certain rights to which it would otherwise avail
itself. Accordingly, the Parties agree, with respect to any
litigation, arbitration, mediation, or any other claim arising under
or related to this Agreement:
Definitions: The following terms, as used herein, have the
following meanings:
a. “Claim Amount” means the total amount of any
costs, claims, liability, or expenses which the
claiming Party is seeking from another Party,
exclusive of any interest, punitive or exemplary
damages.
b. “Custodian” means a person having control of
specific discoverable documents. An “Individual
Custodian” is a person who has control of its
own individual files. A “System Custodian” has
control of a warehouse, online system, or other
server based information store in which data is
not necessarily associated with a single
Custodian.
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c. “Document” means any information that is fixed
in a tangible form and any information that is
stored in a medium from which it can be
retrieved and examined, whether physically or
electronically. Unless specified otherwise, the
term “Document” includes both paper and
electronically stored information.
d. “Legal Hold Notice” means a notice distributed
to potential Custodians within a Party’s
organization which sets forth the basic substance
of the dispute and enumerates the documents to
be preserved and which notifies the Custodian of
its obligations to preserve such documents.
e. “Notice of Dispute” means a notice by one Party
to the designated notice contact of another Party,
setting forth the substance of the dispute, the
timeframe of the relevant facts, a listing of initial
known participants, the amount in dispute, and
making specific reference to this Agreement and
the preservation obligations specified herein.
f. “Producing Party” means the Party upon which a
discovery request has been made.
g. “Requesting Party” means the Party making a
request for discovery.
h. “Server Based Systems” are centralized
computer systems on a network that are shared
by multiple users of the network, including but
not limited to email hosts, web servers, FTP
sites, and databases. Certain systems, such as
email systems, can be considered Server Based
Systems for certain functions such as logging and
user privileges, but data such as individual email
mailboxes are considered part of an Individual
Custodian’s information.
III. Preservation of Information.
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a. Within a reasonable time after receipt of a Notice of
Dispute, the Parties shall:
i. Issue a Legal Hold Notice to its current
employees directly involved with the subject
matter of the dispute directing those employees
to preserve relevant documents in their
possession (with notices sent to additional
current employees directly involved as those
additional employees are identified);
ii. Take reasonable steps to preserve responsive
Documents in the custody of current employees
subject to a Legal Hold Notice who are
terminated or transferred; and
iii. Take reasonable steps to preserve responsive
Documents located in Server Based Systems.
b. No Party shall be required to preserve any Documents
or other information beyond these steps. Specifically
excluded from preservation are [include as appropriate]:
i. Backup tapes;
ii. Information or Documents in the possession of
third party service providers;
iii. Server logs;
iv. Information stored in volatile memory; and
v. Transient metadata.
c. No party is obligated to take preservation efforts prior to
receiving the written Notice of Dispute and the Parties
agree that they will not argue that any failure to
preserve information prior to receiving the written
Notice of Dispute is culpable, wrongful, or sanctionable
in any fashion.
d. The Parties acknowledge that these preservation steps
may be less than what might be otherwise required
absent this agreement and may be insufficient to
preserve many documents that might ultimately be
discoverable in litigation, but expressly agree to limit
the Parties’ preservation obligations as set forth herein.
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IV. Production of Documents.
a. Determination of Individual Custodians. The parties
agree that:
i. In matters where the Claim Amount involves less
than $5 Million, each Party shall only be required
to collect, search and produce Documents from
no more than five (5) Individual Custodians
directly involved in the dispute.
ii. In matters where the Claim Amount is greater
than $5 Million, the collection and production
shall be limited to no more than twenty (20)
Individual Custodians.
iii. The Requesting Party shall be entitled to identify
the Individual Custodians specified in paragraphs
i. and ii. above from whom documents are to be
collected, by name or job responsibility.
iv. In the event that a Producing Party voluntarily
produces Documents from an Individual
Custodian not designated by a Requesting Party
pursuant to paragraphs i. and ii. above (i.e. to
support its own claims or defenses), such
Producing Party may be required, upon request
of the Requesting Party, to collect, search and
produce Documents from such Individual
Custodian.
b. Server Based Systems. The Parties agree that, upon
request, each Party shall furnish to the other a listing
of those Server Based Systems which are likely to
contain responsive Documents, including the name of
the system, a brief description of the system, a brief
description of the likely responsive data stored in the
system, a good faith estimate of the number of
records likely to be responsive and their size, and the
name and title of the System Custodian. Each Party
shall only be required to collect, search, and produce
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Documents from no more than three (3) Server Based
Systems as requested by a Requesting Party.
V. Liability.
a. No Party shall be liable for the deletion or destruction
of any Discovery Materials unless such Party had
actual knowledge of the relevance of such Discovery
Materials at the time of deletion or destruction [after
receiving receipt of a written Notice of Dispute.] 107
b. Absent a claim of fraud, misrepresentation, or bad
faith supported by clear and convincing evidence, no
Producing Party shall be liable for, and no
Requesting Party shall seek any remedy for
spoliation, adverse inference instruction or other
sanction from any Producing Party provided such
Producing Party has complied with its obligations
under this Section.
VI. Procedures and Cooperation.
a. The Parties agree that any protective order, case
management order, or similar order governing
preservation and discovery shall incorporate the
terms of this Section. The Parties further agree that
they shall agree to an order pursuant to Rule 502(d)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar
provision providing for the return of privileged
documents and preventing the waiver of such
privilege in the case of such returned documents.
b. The Parties may, by mutual agreement, modify any
of the provisions of this Section. The Parties agree to
cooperate to the extent practical in the conduct of
discovery. Specifically, the Parties shall endeavor to:
i. Utilize internal ESI discovery “point persons” to
assist counsel in preparing requests and
responses;

107

The bracketed language is optional.
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ii. Exchange information on relevant data sources,
including those not being searched, or schedule
early disclosures on the topic of Electronically
Stored Information;
iii. Jointly develop automated search and retrieval
methodologies to cull relevant information;
iv. Promote early identification of form or forms of
production;
v. Develop case-long discovery budgets based on
proportionality principles; and
vi. Consider court-appointed experts, volunteer
mediators, or formal ADR programs to resolve
discovery disputes.
VII. Indemnification: If any Requesting Party seeks to compel a
Producing Party to require greater preservation, collection, or
production requirements than are set forth herein (or seeks relief
based upon the other party’s failure to preserve, collect or produce
documents beyond the obligations contained herein), or otherwise
breaches any of the provisions of this Section, or challenges the
enforceability of any provisions of this Section, the Requesting
Party shall indemnify the other Party for any costs associated with
defending against such efforts and any costs incurred as a result of
any increased requirements that may result from such efforts,
including all reasonable legal fees, outside vendor costs, and
internal expenses associated with the collection, review, redaction,
and production of such documents.
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